This week’s Notebook has two in-depth topics:
1) How Geelong invest in the dangerous spaces of a field, using them to defend effectively and attack with precision
2) How St Kilda are flying a little under most radars with the minutes played by younger players, and how it’s causing a few more errors than we’re accustomed to seeing from Ross Lyon’s teams
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How Geelong invest in the dangerous spaces of a field
Even if a team is defending with 18 superhumans, they can’t defend every blade of grass on a field at once.
Even if a team is attacking with 18 Usain Bolts, they can’t cover every blade of grass on a field at once.
So teams are left with decisions to make. Which areas of a field do we prioritise when we’re defending? Which areas of the field do we prioritise when we’re in possession?
Geelong, perhaps a little more than most teams, invest their resources into defending the dangerous areas – leaving other space free – and then capitalising going the other way on offence.
The defensive aspect of that was more noticeable than normal against Carlton because of the threat Charlie Curnow and Harry McKay provide, which also made for an easier example to illustrate the process.
When a team is defending, the ideal situation is presenting the attacking side with two choices: a bad option, and an even worse option. The alternative is making the attacking side’s preferred option as hard to execute as possible.
Because of McKay and Curnow’s presence, naturally Carlton want to get it to either of those players as often as possible, in as optimal a position as possible. Not rocket science so far.
To defend that, Geelong protect the areas around those two with extra numbers, Cats either shading off their direct matchups or dropping back. It leaves other options available, but Carlton players with the choice: go with what we’re supposed to be doing, or change on the fly?
In this screenshot, we see two things (deliberately leaving out Cats players’ names because it’s about focusing on the system rather than individual):
1) An extra Cats defender
2) The winger happily ignoring a lead up to protect any McKay lead/drop back for extra support
It’s not completely selling out the team system, but it’s extra resources to take away Carlton’s preferred option. Cripps could have taken the short, in-board kick, but adjustments on the fly are tricky. Especially when the main option is so successful most of the time.
And, slowed down a little bit, this is how the kick inside 50 plays out and ends in an intercept mark. Note how there are other options for Carlton. Geelong are okay with that; it looks risky, but they believe they’re playing the percentages with the areas they choose to defend and it works out.
Then when the ball is at contests – whether stoppages or general play – it’s much the same mindset, trying to get players both on the move and taking the space that hurts opponents most.
For most other teams it’d be a risk too great, because it’s often moving through the inside layer and leaves vulnerabilities from a clean contest or stoppage loss. But in Geelong’s case, they know there’s such a strong defensive structure behind the ball it can mop up plenty of ball as illustrated above.
This frame shows how Geelong players have got inside Carlton’s positioning through movement…
…which leads to a clearance and another stoppage closer to goal. This is the one we’ll use a clip to illustrate the same concept as the frame above. It’s important to keep in mind the Cats are naturally going to be more aggressive than normal in the forward 50, but the general contest principles are still the same: own the dangerous space, move through it, try to own it.
It’s deliberately slowed down to reveal how much Geelong own the space that hurts an opponent. Although this example is from a forward 50 stoppage, we see similar around the field at 50-50 contests from start to finish in a game.
With the above two principles bedded into the foundations, it leaves plenty of space elsewhere to use when Geelong do gain possession further out from home.
When it changes into that phase of the game, the key for the Cats is using the space decisively, whether quickly by run, or quickly by distance of possession.
The Cats are only slightly in the positive for time in possession this season, and perhaps unsurprisingly it dips comfortably into the negatives once the game against North Melbourne is removed from the equation. I feel like I have enough brownie points queued up to be allowed to say that.
In addition, no side kicks long more often – as a percentage of their total – than Geelong. It’s an offensive profile that differs greatly from teams alongside them in the top three on the ladder.
For long kicks, Geelong are first where Sydney are 13th and GWS 17th. For time in possession (including North’s game here for the sake of completeness), Geelong are eighth where Sydney are second and GWS third.
Investment in the dangerous spaces when defending, or in the contest, turns into the ability to use dangerous space in possession. To devastating effect.
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The direction of St Kilda’s list
The usual mainstream grumblings – albeit not in huge quantity given there is easier low hanging North Melbourne* fruit to pluck elsewhere – have begun about where St Kilda are at, for the grave crime of losing to Port Adelaide in Adelaide and slipping to 2-5 on the season after a tough fixture to start 2024.
(*Two North Melbourne references in one Notebook. To be clear though the one piece worth reading is Sam Landsberger’s deep dive in the Herald Sun which lays everything out with precision.)
It’s the usual criticisms around the list that have been heard before – especially by me! – but what appears to be going under the radar is how St Kilda are now regenerating relatively quickly.
Only three sides – North Melbourne, Hawthorn, and West Coast – give more minutes to players in their age 22 year or below…
…it’s just concealed slightly because the Saints are still top half for minutes by players in their age 29 year or above:
Obviously it’s not as simple as ‘give minutes to young guys, everything will be okay eventually’. But it’s a significant uptick from 2023 in minutes to that younger bracket, and the majority given key roles to boot:
– Darcy Wilson is already a key member of the best 22, seven games in
– Hugo Garcia has instantly seen midfield minutes in his first few games
– Mattaes Phillipou has continued in the tough high half-forward role with sporadic midfield minutes
– Mitch Owens is down a little bit in his second season as a best 22 player, but still being asked to fill an important role forward
– Nasiah Wanganeen-Milera is the key mover off half back, even with all the options thrown through there
– The discussion about what Marcus Windhager’s ceiling is a longer-form one best suited for another time but right now he’s getting bulk midfield minutes, thrown into the fire during Brad Crouch’s absence
And then of course just out of this age bracket there are the likes of Liam Henry (currently injured), Max King, and Jack Higgins; all foundational pieces.
Understandably a couple of the 22 and under bracket aren’t in the best form at the moment, but that’s part of life at AFL level. If these players are to reach their potential ceiling, they get past early struggles.
And if they don’t and become just another player – which will likely happen with one or two based on pure probabilities – it’s been found quickly, and list management strategies can be revised to suit without wasting too much time.
The important part is it’s clear – or should be clear, anyway – things are being tried, both in-game and with the greater list management strategy. Ross Lyon’s answer to this question on Friday night revealed as much:
The issue is when there’s a growing group of inexperience combined with a veteran group that ranges between okay to slightly above okay with a couple of exceptions – we’re not relitigating the latter discussion, it’s been done to death – it leads to a mass of errors, simply because the group as a collective isn’t good enough to execute correctly and overcome some of the list holes in place long before this group took over.
There’s a difference between not trying to attack versus attacking but not being good enough to execute. To my eyes St Kilda are very much in the latter category.
Through seven rounds of the season, no side has more turnovers than St Kilda. Some of that is by design due to the overall game style, but it still bears repeating – no side has turned the ball over more.
The underlying offensive numbers aren’t panic stations; defensive 50 to inside 50 transition is only a little under league average, scoring per inside 50s the same, although those bulk turnovers are cruelling any chance of dictating field position.
It’s all been done with a really tough fixture over the first third of the season; a fixture that begins to open up from here. If panic stations stem from believing this isn’t the right style to play, then that’s perfectly reasonable. But if it comes without taking on board what they’re doing on the field and with general list decisions, it’s not worth a second thought.
Besides, there’s every chance St Kilda will be 5-5 in three weeks time and the narrative will switch again. For ~reasons~.
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For those who have missed previous Notebook entries, here are links to the last five weeks:
Collingwood’s swarm, valued veterans, Expected Score: FTN, R6
Goldstein v English, Fremantle’s ceiling: FTN, R5
A change for Naughton, Adelaide’s system issues: FTN, R4
Converting from clearances, shifting a defence: FTN, R3
Returning to old habits: Adelaide’s midfield mix: FTN, R2
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