North Melbourne’s 49-point loss to Geelong on Saturday functions as a fascinating litmus test on what people choose to take away from a game.
There aren’t really any wrong answers either. Whether you’re glass half full, half empty, overflowing, or completely empty, there is something for everyone.
If you’re choosing to hold on to the fact North were the better side from roughly halfway through the first quarter to halfway through the third – and how that is a level of progress not seen against Geelong for multiple years – it makes sense.
If you’re choosing to focus on North leading by seven points with six minutes remaining in the third quarter before conceding 14 goals and losing by 49 – it makes sense.
And if you’re choosing to focus on how Geelong are at a level where they can manipulate matchups and positioning to exploit opposition weak links – that makes sense too.
Of course there’s room for all the above to coexist and perhaps the most interesting part is what North themselves choose to prioritise out of the review. But we’ll circle back, as they say, to that at the end. In the meantime, a look at the game itself.
A positive sign for the growth of Finn O’Sullivan was North opting to use him as a ‘regular’ midfielder, for lack of a better term, in George Wardlaw’s absence. Instead it was Simpkin who was handed the defensive role on Bailey Smith.
With Smith basically the ‘first receiver’ in Geelong’s midfield – comfortably leading his team in handball receives this year and last – the theory was to basically cut off the chains that develop from Smith’s ridiculous running ability from contest to contest. If the likes of Tom Atkins and James Worpel had to move outside their strengths, forced to drive play instead of dishing to those who do the job every week, then it would be a tick for North.
(Tangent: If Champion Data can track ruck contests for ruckmen, surely they can track around-the-ground stoppage attendance for midfielders as well? It’d provide a useful insight into rotations and the half forwards who basically play as extra on-ballers once play exits the centre ball up. Anyway.)
Aside from that it was more or less the same structural setup across the ground, with the difference being how Geelong’s discipline and versatility would eventually cause some problems later on.
We got a glimpse of the discipline early in Geelong’s hot start. What their forwards do really well is work in sync with each other, running their own ‘lanes’, so to speak. It forces tough decisions from defenders given how trained they are in the art of help defence – come off your man to help your teammate, rely on others to pick up the slack.
It only takes one error for everything to collapse, which this clip illustrates once we see both angles. On the live view it looks as if Cam Zurhaar makes the error in no man’s land instead of monitoring Brad Close. But on the behind the goals shot we see Aidan Corr stuck nowhere, creating a domino effect which gives Geelong the extra player. In their forward 50.
It wasn’t only Corr making these decisions, as the collective unit struggled early on. In this case it was Luke Parker switching off for a moment and allowing an easy over the top to Shaun Mannagh. Although the set shot missed and North were let off the hook, unfortunately it wasn’t Parker’s best day, pushed and pulled into different situations as the game went on.
Once North managed to take a breath, it was noticeable how they’d slightly adjusted their offensive plan to fit the dimensions of the bowling lane at GMHBA Stadium. The narrowness meant nearly no chance of the uncontested possession to dictate tempo that had been a feature so far this year.
Instead it was a bit of a return to elements we saw at times last year, working contest to contest and then looking to burst from there. It was North’s lowest kick to handball ratio of the year (184 kicks, 183 handballs), second lowest mark tally, along with their second highest tallies in distance gained per kick and distance gained per handball this season.
With all those ‘second’ tallies sitting behind the West Coast loss in Round 2, it’s important to stop for a moment and highlight the difference between both games. In the West, North were forced into a style they didn’t want to play.
Against Geelong, we can see it was exactly how North wanted to play because they were in control of the game from roughly halfway through the first quarter to halfway through the third, give or take a few minutes here or there.
Even though nearly none of it was clean, it’s what games at GMHBA tend to look like. We can see here the handball game working, just about…
…and here we can see the theory behind the long kick and work off the back of it:
(Important note: In no normal world do you regularly want long kicks going to a 50-50 contest centrally at the tip of the 50. This is just a clip used to demonstrate a broad overview of the plan)
This was how North turned the early Q1 23-point deficit into a Q3 seven-point lead. While the game was largely on their terms, meanwhile Geelong were shifting magnets and moving their midfielders around.
Simpkin’s tag on Smith had made him largely ineffective, so Geelong subtly shifted his role from an on-baller to a high half forward coming up to contests and playing as an extra midfielder, even flipping around and approaching stoppages from the defensive side.
Max Holmes and Tanner Bruhn were essentially alternating between high half back and on-ball at the click of a finger, all while Oisin Mullin continued to follow Harry Sheezel around.
With Atkins and Worpel maintaining their midfield roles, all the fluctuations meant Geelong were able to populate contests and neutralise part of North’s contest and stoppage advantage, while also pushing and pulling Roos into positions they weren’t planning on going.
From the stoppage that led to Mannagh’s (advantage) goal, in a split second we see Jack Martin take Parker through the stoppage, Atkins and Mannagh hand over v Daniel and O’Sullivan, leaving just enough room for Smith to fly through, causing enough of a panic for Daniel to hold on and give away a free.
It’s high-level stoppage work from Geelong and comes from their ability to manipulate roles and positions.
Then came the two skill errors near three quarter time that changed the game flow; Spargo’s dropped intercept mark and Griffin Logue’s missed kick that led to Daniel’s turnover. They don’t need video replays but without them, those completely avoidable passages, the game resets at essentially even.
Even allowing for Jack Darling’s early fourth quarter goal, it was still North working from behind. From the ensuing centre ball up we saw the knock-on effect from moving Smith to high half forward.
With Simpkin following Smith, it meant one of North’s back six had to move into the centre. In this case it was Parker, and Atkins was able to read play far better than him.
Although Atkins didn’t go on to break lines, or anything like that (as mentioned earlier), it was still a clean centre clearance that Geelong could put inside 50. From there Mannagh is able to get prime position front and centre over Daniel and sneak through another goal. It’s a passage that wouldn’t have been possible without Geelong’s positional shifts.
A minute later, Sheezel drops an uncontested chest mark inside forward 50. Geelong rebound (after a free kick against Trembath) and work to a ball up on the wing. From the ensuing stoppage it’s Holmes who beats Parker hands down and kick starts a possession chain.
With the North defence slow to react – except Dylan Stephens’ herculean effort to spoil – it leads to another shot at goal that’s converted, this time by Martin. Again, another passage made possible by Geelong’s shifting.
It was the cue for North to drop the Smith tag which had worked well up until that point, looking to shift gears and work their way back into the game. But a collective head drop was evident and everything else was only going to go one way.
A combination of avoidable errors and Geelong being, well, Geelong, all combined to change a winnable game into a blowout in a matter of minutes.
The topic of whether dropping the head and letting go of the rope should be avoidable is another one where people will sit on both sides of the fence. Or both sides of the rope, as it will.
It’s the first time we’ve seen North let go of the rope this year, which differs from stopping opposition run-ons and is more focused on what happens late in matches. It’s something to keep an eye on. Not necessarily for the end result of a game, because letting go of the rope only happens when the result is already decided, but more for the mentality piece. If it happens regularly then the inability to keep working will bleed into other areas of North’s game.
Nevertheless, as promised, to finish off we’re circling back to what they could choose to take out of the game. It’s where coaching is arguably at its most important.
Some players will have a better reaction by highlighting the positive elements, while others can be prompted by a bit of a clip. The flip side is if the same mistakes (in this case, interpret as: skill issues) are made consistently, sometimes there needs to be a bit of a circuit breaker and the riot act read every so often to bring things to a head.
We’ll get our answer to how the game was reviewed at Marvel Stadium on Saturday. To have a chance to push Sydney, the positives from GMHBA need to remain while the avoidable mistakes must be nearly non-existent.
Because on a proper AFL ground, against a Swans outfit who play extremely quick and direct – first in metres gained per handball, second in metres gained per kick at time of writing – the mistakes will be punished far more than they were on the bowling lane.