The first minor premiers in the final-eight era to depart from finals in straight sets, Adelaide saw an 18-win home and away season amount to nothing.
The absence of Izak Rankine, and inability for other midfielders to step up in his absence, took away Adelaide’s main strengths and highlighted their flaws.
For all that, Adelaide’s fixes in 2026 present as relatively straight forward if the right lessons are learned. It means there’ll be four parts to today’s post.
The first two will be game-specific trends from the losses to Collingwood and Hawthorn, before moving onto the two key lessons learned, finishing with the fixes for 2026 and beyond.
v Collingwood
All the worries around Adelaide’s on-ball mix without Rankine, as illustrated in their Finals Dossier, played out in horrifyingly slow motion against Collingwood.
– More attention on Jordan Dawson restricting his output
The captain had 19 disposals, including just two in the crucial third quarter as Collingwood invested plenty into stopping his game.
Without Dawson having a strong game, it meant…
– A lack of creativity in possession
Although Adelaide’s contested possession rate was already the highest in the league over the home and away season, it increased to another level against Collingwood – and not by design.
Partly due to Collingwood’s defence, and partly due to Adelaide’s personnel, contested possession after contested possession made it tough to keep the ball. It meant…
– An inability to control tempo and the ball
Because of the abnormally high contested possession rate, it meant there was no control in Adelaide’s game.
In the non-blowout department (i.e. once you remove lots of West Coast’s games), Adelaide’s 303 disposals against Collingwood was one of the lowest tallies this year.
– A lack of secondary options
In the second half, Rory Laird was thrown into the midfield for stints. Before then, he hadn’t attended a single centre bounce all year.
But even though Laird’s midfield time is generally behind him, a look elsewhere didn’t inspire too much confidence.
All the above meant Adelaide tried to keep the game as much of a grind as possible, because they didn’t have the tools to win any other way. It didn’t leave much of a margin for error so when the third quarter Collingwood burst came, it essentially killed the contest.
With only one change to the starting 22 for the semi-final against Hawthorn – Brodie Smith into the 22 for Hugh Bond, with Josh Rachele as the sub – the query was what the Crows would change against an opposition who play much differently to the Pies.
v Hawthorn
Hawthorn’s different method of play to Collingwood presented a separate challenge to Collingwood.
The Hawks aren’t often an explosive team out of contest, but what they have done superbly in the second half of the season is grind the opposition down from there – more of a death by thousand cuts process – and then using it to start their forward half game.
For Adelaide it meant not only did they need to win the midfield battle for all the usual purposes, but also because losing it would significantly expose their other flaw – transition and defensive half ball use.
In the home and away season Adelaide ranked 16th in turning rebound 50s to inside 50s. While it was largely covered up by their strengths elsewhere, there was no hiding against the Hawks. Losing contested possession by 31 meant Hawthorn were able to dictate tempo nearly from start to finish, and the results were obvious.
All the same flaws against Collingwood popped up again, with the additional gut punch of being trapped away from goal for long, long periods of time. The time in forward half stat was glaring – nearly 61 percent Hawthorn’s way, which translated to more than 20 minutes of real time.
Although there aren’t exact numbers available (for me), the differential must surely rank near the top for games this season. The game often devolved into Adelaide fruitlessly looking for ways out of the pockets they were trapped in, with no available levers to pull and change the feel of the game.
When the midfield is soundly beaten, with no way for back half ball use to counter it, there are no realistic tools left to threaten the scoreboard consistently.
The two key takeaways
While the lights were too bright for a handful of Crows, there’s a fork in the road when determining how to assess it.
Without Rankine, and with so much attention placed on Dawson, the other midfielders needed to step up. As a collective, as harsh as it sounds, they failed. A list of happenings, both individual and team, from the two finals, curtailed for brevity so we don’t go on for another thousand words:
– Sam Berry ended both games outside of the midfield
– James Peatling had a season-low nine disposals against Collingwood
– Jake Soligo had a season-low one clearance against Collingwood
– Collingwood’s midfielders were the most influential players on the ground
– Lost the contested possession count by 31 to Hawthorn
– Hawthorn’s midfielders were the most influential players on the ground
The performances of Berry, Soligo, and Peatling – three of Adelaide’s five main on-ballers this year alongside Dawson and Rankine – were poor. For the first two, it was their finals debut, while Peatling had slightly more experienced.
The swing moment is how Adelaide judge the performances of the trio. Were they poor because finals are above their level? Or was it just a normal part of the learning curve? It’s not an exaggeration to say the decision – and whether it’s right or wrong – determines – plenty going forward.
When the midfield is so badly beaten, it makes other flaws look worse than what they really are, but nevertheless the ability to score off turnover – so long a strength for Adelaide – vanished against Collingwood and Hawthorn.
Throughout the year, Adelaide largely forced turnovers from a position of strength. It meant when they did gain possession, it was in areas easier to score from: third in points scored per turnover during the home and away season.
But in the two finals losses, their midfield losses, ceding dominance from the first phase of play, meant the turnovers they did force too often happened in positions tough to score from.
From the third best team in points scored per turnover, their two finals saw scoring at a rate that would have ranked last in the league over a full season – by a long, long way.
We saw it against Hawthorn; most times Adelaide got the ball back, without Rankine, and with other midfielders down, there were no tools left to threaten the opposition.
It’s not as if the conundrum is unanswerable. The first steps towards a solution should be simple.
The lessons to be learned
Without Rankine, and with the other midfielders struggling under the pressure, Adelaide became just another team. The key fix: take another step forward with the on-ball mix.
While it obviously starts with Rankine’s return, the next steps shouldn’t take too much brainpower. In no particular order, from what’s currently available internally:
– Josh Rachele to come into the mix more often when healthy
– Dan Curtin to graduate into more midfield minutes rather than primarily wing
– Force feed minutes to Sid Draper to fast track his progression
– Keeping an eye on the second-tier players (Dowling, etc) and their development
The deeper, more rounded rotation will put pressure on a couple of best-22 players this season who wilted in the finals, but that’s okay. It’s all part of the learning curve that can be ruthless at times.
A domino effect is how the deeper mix will necessitate a change elsewhere, namely in the forward mix. As Taylor Walker ages out – assuming at this stage he carries on next year – the natural spot is to replace his forward rotation with a midfielder working through.
The beauty of optionality is how it changes each week depending on matchups. Maybe sometimes it’s a player like Curtin or Dawson playing as a tweener third tall more often. Or it could be against an opposition with vulnerability at ground level, so Rankine and Rachele spend more time in the forward half.
It requires a flexibility that hasn’t been a feature of Adelaide’s setup – even this year, it was settled roles and responsibilities each week – but it presents as such a natural evolution, it should be straight forward.
The second priority should be somewhat minimised by a more dynamic midfield, but it’s improving the transition offence. It was the main weakness throughout the year, only amplified in September when the other strengths fell to the wayside.
It’s hard envisioning too many personnel changes from Adelaide’s first choice back seven throughout the year, which makes any slight shift based on system and the more dynamic midfield.
But the wildcard in all of this, without relitigating it all, is Adelaide have traditionally not responded well to setbacks. The most successful organisations contextualise both success and failure. Hopefully for Adelaide’s sake they do the same before hitting 2026.