Site icon The Shinboner

Rock Bottom (defensively): Round 6, 2025 v Carlton

Sometimes it’s hard figuring out where to start for good reasons. Today it was hard figuring out where to start for the exact opposite.

It’s not the first time this title has been used for a post. Last time it was after what turned out to be an infamous night in Brisbane: Round 3, 2022 when the Lions had approximately 1,242 final quarter inside 50s, and post-game David Noble sprayed everyone ever associated with North Melbourne in their 155-year history.

This time the title refers to all aspects of the defence. It’s been an increasingly common theme through the early stages of 2025, and it hit crisis point against Carlton. The system looks completely broken for a number of reasons, which we’ll get through today.

Ideally this post serves as a reference point for the rest of the season as a marker of progress.

Given the mood amongst the fanbase is swinging wildly between riotous and resigned, it’s important to post the semi-regular two-level disclaimer before moving to the body of the piece:

1) This isn’t supposed to be a ‘let’s pick on <player>’ session, or for these passages to be used as ammo for that elsewhere. It’s supposed to be an overarching view of what’s going wrong, and how.

2) Identifying issues is one skill set. Implementing solutions is another. That’s why the coaches get paid the big bucks. Or in the case of assistant coaches league-wide, the medium to low bucks.

The Patreon is up and running once again for 2025, which you can find right here. The three tiers are much the same as previous years, with refined features for the top two.

In addition to Patreon, you can find me on Twitter – and also Bluesky, where vibes are much more pleasant and there’s much less hate. It’s nice.

There are, in my eyes at least, four key flaws in North’s defensive setup. Two stem from stoppages, two come in general play. Those four areas are what’ll be covered today.

The passages won’t necessarily be in chronological order, but given Carlton kicked 12.5 from stoppages – which felt like double that in the moment – it makes sense to start there.

In theory – in theory – stoppages should be where a team is best able to reset, given they’re all set plays unless something unexpected has happened. Doubly so when it’s a stoppage in a team’s defensive 50 and field location provides extra importance on the contest.

Often the defending team look to have an extra player at the stoppage, blocking the space while also making it easier to win and clear the area. In this upcoming clip, it’s exactly what North did. However, there was one big issue…

Somehow with an extra Kangaroo at the stoppage, Carlton still had more than enough space to orchestrate a two-on-one inside it at the bottom right area of the screen. Let’s repeat so there’s no confusion: In an area where North Melbourne had an extra player, Carlton had a two-on-one.

Unsurprisingly it ends in an Adam Cerra snap, albeit only a minor score.

This comes down to basic structural efficiency. Stoppage setups in this area of the ground should have clear roles for everyone involved, covering both space and direct opponents. If you get beaten by a set play, then so be it. But to gift the opposition dangerous space in their forward 50 is inexcusable.

Before moving on to future clips, a slight detour to emphasise some of Carlton’s stoppage dominance came from Tom De Koning straight up beating Tristan Xerri in their head-to-head battle. Three of Carlton’s five first quarter stoppage goals stemmed directly from clean De Koning wins.

Sometimes it happens! It’s not the end of the world to get beaten by someone better than you on the day. What is crucial is to make the opposition beat you and not gift them opportunities.

The latter happened far too often. In addition to structural efficiency, there was an inability to stay involved in play through the second phase.

For an example, let’s look from the centre bounce leading to Carlton’s first goal. Harry Sheezel moves over to George Hewett after the latter wins the ball. But after Hewett’s initial disposal, Sheezel simply switches off and allows Hewett to get a second disposal which finds Charlie Curnow on the lead.

Stoppage play at AFL level isn’t a one-effort game, especially when defending. Often players use the ability to ‘split’ on either side of the mark as a way to protect the corridor without infringing in the protected area. It’s also an easy way to deflect responsibility elsewhere.

The standard broadcast view doesn’t tell the full story, but the second angle most definitely does:

For those who have missed it, the last five posts on The Shinboner, plus…

2025’s Team Structures Page, now updated
Checking in on the 0-5 teams: Round 5’s Notebook
North Melbourne’s Round 5 analysis v Gold Coast
Minutes played by age: Round 4’s Notebook
North Melbourne’s Round 4 analysis v Sydney
Method shifts: Round 3’s Notebook

Again it’s important to emphasise this isn’t meant to single out Sheezel; it was the clearest of about 10-12 examples across various midfielders to illustrate what’s happening at stoppages.

The two fundamental issues are around base setups and then a lack of ability to stay engaged in play through the following phases.

Whether those issues are bigger than the next section covering general play is probably a matter of individual opinion, but either way they’re both playing a part in the T20 sized scores conceded most weeks.

Defending in space requires decisions to be made. Usually it comes down to one of two things: press high or drop back.

To be fair, it can be difficult, and the above is an oversimplification. Last week’s Gold Coast piece had a couple of examples of coming to try and spoil but not killing the ball, leading to easy goals over the top. The key difference to keep in mind is in those cases, a decision was made.

If a defender doesn’t choose to either press high or drop back, instead remaining in an area where they can’t impact, it means two things:

1) They essentially take themselves out of play
2) Because they’re in an unpredictable position, it leaves their teammates second guessing

Which then ultimately results in easier opposition ball movement.

The passage we’ll use to highlight this comes from halfway through the second quarter, where a North inside 50 becomes a Carlton set shot in a matter of seconds.

Nick Haynes’ rushed clearing kick somehow finds Curnow, and we see Griffin Logue caught in two minds and stuck in no man’s land as a result:

If Logue is to press high, he needs to be close enough to smell Curnow. If Logue is to drop back, he needs to be in a position to either stop overlap runners or the next kick.

Because he’s neither, it’s way too easy for Hewett to waltz over the top and continue the possession chain. From the moment Haynes’ kick was in the vicinity of Curnow, only a Carlton skill error would have stopped the passage.

Sometimes there’ll be wrong decisions made, which is inevitable. No team is perfect. But either way, there just has to be a decision made consistently. Ideally it’s to press high, but maybe it’s to sit back and rely on those around the ball to slow movement down. That would be okay too! Whatever it is, it just has to be predictable to one another.

Look at Collingwood as an example of what it’s like when a well drilled team is functioning. Players don’t make the right decision all the time. But all the time, players know what their teammate should be doing.

For North right now, it’s a complete lottery. Come to think of it, there might actually be better odds of winning a lower Powerball division over knowing what defensive read a Roo will make.

The Create Your Own Depth Chart feature is now part of the List Management suite, all on the $5 tier for Patreon subscribers:

You can subscribe to the Patreon for 2025 right here. The three tiers are much the same as previous years, with refined features for the top two.

The second part of North’s defensive flaws in general play, the fourth and final overall, is an unfortunately common topic this year. They’re simply not defending the dangerous spaces on the field, and as a result, are overly susceptible to sides switching up the angles.

For example, when a team is in possession and goes wide to the boundary (as opposed to just slightly shifting outside a set defence), they’re odds on to look for a way back into the corridor at some point in the chain. At least unless they’ve found a simple path all the way home via a scenic route.

It means the defensive team wants to keep the offensive team as wide as possible, for as long as possible. If the offensive team can consistently create scoring shots via lower percentage areas, then so be it and congratulations.

Too often against Carlton, and in general throughout the year, North have gifted the dangerous areas back, time and time again.

The passage we’ll use to illustrate comes from the last quarter, amongst the Blues’ goal procession. Although the clip ends in a Jesse Motlop goal, the key pair to watch through the corridor are Caleb Daniel and Cooper Lord.

Although Carlton still move it to the outer wing a little too easily after switching it, at least they’ve been forced very wide. Every time the defensive team is in this situation, the goal is to keep the offensive team wide. Every time.

Instead, in this case Daniel looks to cut off an irrelevant lane, leaving a simple inboard kick from Matt Cottrell to Lord, opening the forward 50 up for more shenanigans.

(Important note: The temptation is to point at Tom Powell in the footage. I watched it all play out in real time and it was Daniel’s responsibility)

In case the message hasn’t been repeated enough by this point, the clip isn’t supposed to highlight Daniel specifically. He’s only one of many who have repeatedly done the same thing, whether on Good Friday or elsewhere. It’s a system issue.

If someone was to build basic principles from scratch for a team defence, the following points would likely feature prominently:

1) Clear stoppage structural roles
2) Remain engaged through the second phase of play
3) Make consistent decisions in open play
4) Defend the dangerous space
5) Force opponents to take the lower percentage areas

At the moment North Melbourne are a grand total of zero from five.

There can’t – and won’t – be any progress of note until it’s fixed.

Exit mobile version